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ON CASEBOOKS AND CANONS OR WHY 
BOB JONES UNIVERSITYWILLNEVERBE 
PART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
CANON 
Neal Devins* 
Here is a hard sell: making a plausible-let alone convinc-
ing-case that Bob Jones University v. United Statei is one of the 
canons of constitutional law. As a matter of constitutional doc-
trine, Bob Jones was never that important to begin with and now 
seems destined to fade into oblivion. Indeed, the Court's princi-
pal holding (that racist private schools are not entitled to federal 
tax breaks) was a question of statutory construction. The case's 
constitutional holding (that there is no religious liberty exemp-
tion for a school which prohibits interracial dating as a matter of 
religious conviction) occupies less than two pages in the U.S. 
Reports and, more important, broke no new ground in free exer-
cise decisionmaking. And if that is not enough, the case seems 
irrelevant today. The Supreme Court no longer cites it and aca-
demics no longer write about it.2 
More than anything, Bob Jones seems a story about politics, 
not law.3 By announcing, in January 1982, that racist schools 
were legally entitled to tax breaks, the Reagan administration 
spent much of the next year trying to shake the impression that it 
too was racist. But it could not. Its efforts to justify its interpre-
tation of the tax code-even if legally correct-were politically 
unconvincing. After all, Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign tar-
* Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William 
and Mary. Thanks to Mark Tushnet for giving me an opportunity to revisit Bob Jones 
University, a case that figured prominently in my decision to become a law professor. 
1. 461 u.s. 574 (1983). 
2. In the past five years, Bob Jones has been cited in only one Supreme Court 
opinion-Justice Scalia's dissent in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,598 (1996). 
3. Some of the politics surrounding Bob Jones University is detailed in Louis 
Fisher and Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 52-62 (West, 2d ed. 
1996). 
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geted evangelical voters, in part, by attacking the Carter IRS for 
proposing too strict nondiscrimination enforcement standards, 
standards that Reagan dubbed a "vendetta" against church-
affiliated private schools. 
Making matters worse, civil rights interests-who success-
fully battled the Nixon administration in establishing the nondis-
crimination requirement-saw the Reagan announcement as lit-
tle more than overt racism. Particularly upsetting to the civil 
rights community was the willingness of the administration to 
disavow the nondiscrimination requirement just months after its 
lawyers had told the Supreme Court that Bob Jones University 
should lose its tax exempt status.4 Consequently, when (in the 
midst of this fiasco) Reagan Attorney General William Francis 
Smith told a Congressional committee that the "'President 
doesn't have a discriminatory bone in his body,' the hearing 
room full of civil-rights activists erupted into laughter.''5 Prag-
matists within the administration too saw the policy reversal as a 
catastrophic blunder-blaming this "mess" on lawyers who 
could not see "the human and perceptual side of this. "6 When 
the Supreme Court decided Bob Jones, in May 1983, the admini-
stration gladly accepted defeat, thankful that this political deba-
cle had come to an end. 
That casebook editors do not treat Bob Jones as canonical is 
understandable. What most people (including law professors) 
find interesting about Bob Jones does not have much to do with 
precedent-based legal arguments, theories of judicial interpreta-
tion, and the like. But the very fact that Bob Jones has no place 
in the canon of constitutional law casebooks speaks as much to 
the limitations of the "case and academic commentary" format 
of these books as it does to Bob Jones' apparent lack of canonic-
ity. Bob Jones, for example, might be part of the canon if case-
book editors paid attention to the myriad ways that politics af-
fects the content and reach of Court decisionmaking. And Bob 
Jones might be part of the canon if casebook editors saw statutes 
implicating constitutional values as part of the canon of constitu-
tional law. Finally, if casebook editors did not try to cubbyhole 
4. For a one-sided but nevertheless revealing account of the Justice Department's 
role in Bob Jones, see Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice {Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1987). 
5. Chester E. Finn, Jr., "Affirmative Action" Under Reagan, Commentary 17, 27 
{April1982). 
6. David Whitman, Ronald Reagan and Tax Exemptions for Racist Schools 86 
{1984) (Kennedy School of Government, Case No. ClS-84-609.0) (quoting Michael 
Deaver). 
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cases into one or another doctrinal category (religious liberty, 
equal protection, standing, separation of powers), Bob Jones' 
relevance to cases which are undisputably canonical (Brown v. 
Board of Education, for example) would be underscored, not ig-
nored. 
What follows is an argument for including Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States in the constitutional law canon and an ex-
planation as to why casebook authors are unlikely to heed my 
advice. 
**** 
Law students need to understand that law, especially consti-
tutional law, is anything but a "closed, independent system hav-
ing nothing to do with economic, political, social, or philosophi-
cal science. "7 For example, most landmark Supreme Court 
decisions cannot be understood without paying attention to the 
politics surrounding them. Bob Jones University is a classic ex-
ample of this law-politics mix. Politics helps explain both the 
Court's decision to hear the case and its substantive ruling. In 
hearing the case, the Court played fast and loose with the Article 
III demand that there be a case or controversy between adver-
sary parties. Remember that there was no dispute between the 
Reagan administration and Bob Jones University. Both agreed 
that racist schools should get tax breaks. In fact, the administra-
tion asked the Court to moot the case in January 1982 (when it 
announced its policy shift).8 
The Court, however, appointed William T. Coleman, Jr. to 
argue that the policy shift was illegal. Politics helps explains the 
Court's action. At the time of Bob Jones, Congress and the 
White House both looked to the Court to settle the dispute. 
Congress did not want to legitimate the Reagan administration's 
claim that there was no nondiscrimination requirement in the tax 
code. As such, instead of enacting specific antidiscrimination 
legislation, Congress preferred for the Court to countermand the 
administration. For its part, the Reagan administration did not 
want to pay the price of either granting tax breaks to racist 
schools or of further embarrassing itself (by reversing its policy 
7. Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philosophy 380-81 
n.86 (Archon Books, 1933). 
8. In October, 1981, the Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of 
whether religious schools should be exempt from the IRS's nondiscrimination require-
ment. 454 U.S. 892 (1981). The Reagan Justice Department and Bob Jones University 
both supported the granting of certiorari. 
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shift). Indeed, overwhelmed by criticism of its policy shift, the 
administration substituted its mootness petition with a request 
that the Court appoint "counsel adversary" to Bob Jones Uni-
versity. In granting this request, the Court created the following 
spectacle at oral arguments: The Reagan administration joined 
forces with Bob Jones University in arguing against William 
Coleman (representing the views "heretofore taken" by the 
United States). 
The Court's decision to shirk Article ill is about more than 
interbranch harmony. It is also about institutional survival. 
Were the Justices to have declared Bob Jones nonjusticiable, 
they would have found themselves in the same imbroglio that 
plagued the Reagan administration. Specifically, one year after 
Bob Jones, the Court told civil rights plaintiffs that they were 
without standing to challenge IRS enforcement of the very same 
nondiscrimination requirement that was at issue in Bob Jones. 
While consequential, this decision did not prompt much in the 
way of political fireworks. But if the Court had refused to hear 
Bob Jones, this case, Allen v. Wright,9 would have been the only 
judicial outlet to challenge the Reagan policy shift. As such, it 
would have been politically explosive. By hearing Bob Jones, 
however, the Justices were perceived as civil rights heroes. In 
this way, they could embrace a restrictive (anti-civil rights) ap-
proach to standing doctrine without exposing themselves to po-
litical attack. 
The politics surrounding Bob Jones may also explain the 
Court's cavalier approach to the case's religious liberty issue. 
Rather than show any signs of struggle, the Court dismissed this 
claim without considering the religious liberty interests at stake. 
In particular, the Justices did not discuss either the centrality of 
Bob Jones University's prohibition of interracial dating to its re-
ligious mission or why the government's interest in nondiscrimi-
nation outweighed Bob Jones' freedom to practice its religion as 
it saw fit (especially since it did not take race into account when 
making admissions decisions).10 Ironically, the Court granted 
certiorari in Bob Jones to resolve these very questions. But the 
Reagan policy shift transformed Bob Jones: no longer was it a 
9. 468 U.S. 737 {1984). For further discussion, see note 16 and accompanying text. 
10. At the time of Bob Jones, the Court applied strict, not rational bases, review to 
generally applicable laws that burdened religious exercise. See infra note 17. For an ar-
gument that the religious liberty interests involved were significant, see generally Doug· 
las Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 Tex. L. 
Rev. 259 (1982). 
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case about the rights of religious dissenters; instead, the nation's 
commitment to nondiscrimination was on the line. For this rea-
son, the Court's approach both to religious liberty and Article 
III limitations needs to be understood as part of a far-ranging 
mosaic. As Justice Cardozo suggested: "[W]hen the social needs 
demand one settlement rather than another, there are times 
when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice cus-
tom in the pursuit of other and larger ends. "11 
Those larger ends, of course, link Bob Jones with "the de-
fining event! of modem American constitutionallaw,"12 Brown v. 
Board of Education. On the one hand, the utter failure of the 
Reagan policy reversal makes clear that overt racism is simply 
intolerable. At the same time, Bob Jones reveals that Brown's 
legacy is confined to simple nondiscrimination, not busing, af-
firmative action, or other race-conscious initiatives. In particu-
lar, while finding a nondiscrimination requirement in the tax 
code, Bob Jones distanced itself from Carter-era initiatives to 
compel private schools to admit an IRS-designated number of 
minority students. The Court, instead, signaled that its vision of 
nondiscrimination was consistent with Congress's decision to 
forbid IRS implementation of these Carter initiatives.13 Moreo-
ver, by refusing (in Allen v. Wright) to allow civil rights interests 
to challenge IRS enforcement, the Court refused to become the 
engine for the pursuit of numerical justice. 
The Internal Revenue Code provision at issue in Bob Jones 
is but one of a handful of statutes and agency interpretations 
that have helped shape the meaning of Brown. Indeed, Con-
gress and the White House regularly affect constitutional norms, 
sometimes reenforcing and other times limiting Court decision-
making.14 Likewise, through its interpretation of legislation, the 
Court too affects the reach of its constitutional precedents. Bob 
Jones is an example of this phenomenon-strengthening Brown 
by declaring that Congress, the White House, and the Court see 
"eradicating racial discrimination in education" to be "a funda-
mental, overriding interest. "15 
11. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 65 (Yale U. Press, 
1921). 
12. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 14 (Free Press, 1990). 
13. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,602 n.27 (1983). 
14. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process 
231-74 (Princeton U. Press, 1988); Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law 
Orbits, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1993). 
15. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 604. 
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There is a more practical linkage between Bob Jones and 
Brown. Specifically, were the federal government to reward seg-
regationist academies with tax breaks and the like, the reach of 
Brown would be Iimited.16 After all, these benefits would reduce 
the costs of both attending and maintaining such schools. Fur-
thermore, government support of such schools would provide a 
moral justification of sorts for parents to send their children to 
them. In short, politics affects the reach and, with it, the ulti-
mate meaning of Supreme Court decisions. The story of Brown, 
for example, does not end in 1954. It is an ongoing saga and Bob 
Jones is an important part of it. 
The lesson here is simple: Cases (especially monumental 
cases like Brown) are so much a part of our social fabric that 
they cannot be understood in isolation. Bob Jones, for example, 
calls attention to the need to look backwards (the legacy of 
Brown), the need to look forwards (the costs of turning Allen v. 
Wright into a political battle ground), and the need to look 
around (the desire of Congress, the White House, and the nation 
for the Court to rule on the Reagan policy shift). Along the 
same lines, Bob Jones reveals the perils of placing a case under 
one or another doctrinal heading. Casebook editors (some of 
whom skip the case altogether while others relegate it to a single 
paragraph) see Bob Jones as a religious liberty case. The fact 
that it sheds light on Brown and Allen v. Wright is not mentioned 
at all.17 
**** 
Does Bob Jones University v. United States deserve to be 
part of the canon of constitutional law casebooks? The answer, I 
think, is yes. First, the private school tax exemption controversy 
16. For this very reason, parents of children attending schools subject to a court-
ordered desegregation remedy do have a legal interest in challenging IRS enforcement of 
nondiscrimination requirements. As such, Allen v. Wright's denial of standing to these 
parents seems incorrect. Nevertheless, there is little incentive for the Court to grant 
standing only to rule (as it held in Bob Jones) that-as a matter of statutory construc-
tion-the IRS has broad discretion to implement the nondiscrimination standard. 
17. Bob Jones is illuminating for other reasons. It calls attention to the power of 
one administration to disagree with the policy preferences, including statutory interpreta-
tions, of another administration-a point worth making when teaching the separation of 
powers. It also helps explain why the Supreme Court, ultimately, eschewed strict review 
in religion cases. Specifically, unable to distinguish legitimate from fraudulent claims of 
religious sincerity, the Court jerry rigged a system of strict review of religion claims that 
was, at best, arbitrary. See generally Mayer G. Freed and Daniel D. Polsby, Race, Re-
ligion, and Public Policy: Bob Jones University v. United States,1983 S. Ct. Rev. 1. Over 
time, this system gave way to the bright line test of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 
u.s. 872 (1990). 
2000] SYMPOSIUM: DEVINS 291 
calls attention to the myriad ways that all parts of government 
interact with each other in shaping constitutional values. In par-
ticular, it seems an essential part of the story of Brown v. Board. 
At this level, Bob Jones will help students understand that mod-
em law is about extended cases-cases that "represent the com-
plex process by which grievances are perceived and articulated, 
and by which law is mobilized, applied, reconceived, and under-
stood."18 Second (and relatedly), Bob Jones underscores how 
and why Justices pay attention to politics in crafting their deci-
sions. Third, it exemplifies the ways in which statutory interpre-
tation plays a pivotal role in defining constitutional values. 
Fourth, Bob Jones implicates numerous areas of constitutional 
law, including equality, justiciability, religious liberty, and the 
separation of powers. In this way, it calls attention to the need 
for lawyers to think broadly, rather than focus in on one or an-
other doctrinal cubbyhole. 
True, none of these rationales independently justify can-
onicity, for other cases may do a better job of making any of 
these points. Furthermore, Bob Jones has no particular doc-
trinal salience. In a strange way, however, it is this lack of super 
star status that explains why Bob Jones belongs in the canon. It 
exemplifies the need to look beyond doctrine and towards syn-
ergistic connections-whether they be about politics or about 
law. It is, if you will, a quintessential example of modem law. 
Ironically, the very reasons why Bob Jones arguably belongs 
in the canon are the very same reasons why casebook editors will 
not select it. Case books, at least those written by law professors, 
reenforce the "widely held and deep belief[ ]" that the study of 
constitutional law should be undertaken through a "detailed ex-
amination of Supreme Court decisions, albeit supplemented in 
varying degrees by authors' questions and law review excerpts."19 
This tried and true formula is unlikely to change. Law profes-
sors are used to teaching from casebooks dedicated to Supreme 
18. Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Mod-
ern State 29 (Cambridge U. Press, 1998). 
19. Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1977). Based on my 
survey of a half dozen leading constitutional law casebooks, Monaghan's words still ring 
true today. With the exception of Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson. Processes of Con-
stitutional Decisionmaking (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1992), none of the casebooks I 
surveyed deviated from this case and academic commentary format. See Neal Devins, 
How Constitutional Law Casebooks Perpetuate the Myth of Judicial Supremacy, 3 Green 
Bag 2d at 259 (2000). 
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Court decisions and academic commentary. Casebook editors 
are used to writing such tomes. 
To include Bob Jones in the canon (or at least to include it 
for the reasons I advance) might require a significant retooling 
of the constitutional law course. For example, it would shift em-
phasis away from the Court's reasoning and to the circumstances 
(political and social) which explain the Court's decisionmaking. 
By including Bob Jones in the canon, moreover, the study of 
doctrine would also give way to an understanding of the ways in 
which elected government either inhibits or bolsters Court deci-
sionmaking. Correspondingly, the idea that Court pronounce-
ments settle an issue once and for all would be replaced by the 
notion that judicial pronouncements-even Supreme Court rul-
ings-are simply one data point in ongoing dialogues between 
judges, litigants, elected officials, and the people. For this very 
reason, students would need to learn that Court interpretations 
of statutory language sometimes shape constitutional values as 
much as Court interpretations of the Constitution itself. In other 
words, were Bob Jones part of the canon, casebook editors 
would need to see constitutional law as a broad mosaic that in-
cludes both actors outside the courts and judicial inte~retations 
that technically are about statutes, not the Constitution.20 
Placing Bob Jones in the canon of constitutional law case-
books is an idea whose time has not come. For that to happen, 
the case and academic commentary formula would need to give 
way to a more holistic (less Court-centered) vision of constitu-
tional law. Absent a sea change in the way casebook editors see 
the constitutional law course, however, Bob Jones will never 
make its way into the canon. Casebook editors are skilled at 
reading and editing cases. Unless market pressures demand oth-
erwise, they will find little incentive to invest the time and en-
ergy necessary to incorporate the political and social context of 
Supreme Court decisions into their works. For this very reason, 
it is doubtful that the existing conformity among constitutional 
law texts will give way to the fact that legal academics increas-
ingly talk about both the appropriateness and centrality of non-
judicial constitutional interpretation. At the same time, if hope 
20. Another obstacle to including Bob Jones in the canon is that the case cuts across 
numerous doctrinal categories and, consequently, does not neatly fit in a doctrinal cub-
byhole. There is little prospect of casebook editors building their books around organ-
izational frameworks that are not tied to doctrine. With that said, Bob Jones could be a 
capstone case study considered at the end of the course or, alternatively, it could operate 
as a case study within a doctrinal category (most likely equality). 
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springs eternal, this wave of scholarship suggests the possibility 
of a retooling of the constitutional law casebook.21 And perhaps 
there is also some hope that Bob Jones will eventually take its 
place among the sequoias of constitutional law. Stay tuned (but 
do not hold your breath). 
21. It is noteworthy, for example, that (in the past two years) Bruce Ackerman, 
Cass Sunstein, and Mark Tushnet have all published books that are very much about the 
legitimacy and centrality of nonjudicial constitutional interpretation. It is also notewor-
thy that several of the participants in this symposium focus their entries on the Constitu-
tion outside of the Court. 
